



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/26071
12 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 JULY 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council have taken note with appreciation of your report of 29 June 1993 (S/26005) regarding the recent discovery, at locations inside and outside El Salvador, of illegal arms deposits belonging to the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN).

The members of the Security Council express their continuing concern regarding this grave violation of the Peace Accords, and agree with your opinion that the maintenance of clandestine arms deposits by the FMLN has raised questions of confidence and trust and that the seriousness of this situation cannot be over-emphasized.

The members of the Council reiterate their view that both parties should comply fully with their respective obligations under the Peace Accords, and especially that the FMLN should provide a complete inventory of all its arms and munitions both inside and outside El Salvador and deliver them to ONUSAL for their destruction in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Accords.

The members of the Council note the FMLN's promise to disclose all its holdings of arms and munitions and subsequently to destroy them by 4 August 1993. The members of the Council stress that the complete disarmament of the FMLN, and the reintegration of its members into the civil, political and institutional life of the country, form an essential part of the peace process.

The members of the Security Council share your assessment that it is an indication of the strength and irreversibility of the peace process that a serious incident of this nature has not been allowed to derail the implementation of the Peace Accords. The members of the Council also agree with your view that the cancellation or suspension of the FMLN's status as a political party could deal a severe blow to the peace process.

The members of the Council welcome the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua addressed to you on 22 June 1993 (S/26008), and expect that the Government of Nicaragua will comply with its international obligations to prevent the use of its territory for the illegal storage or transshipment of arms and other war matériel and to investigate fully all the illegal arms deposits discovered in Nicaragua, including possible links to international terrorism.

S/26071
English
Page 2

The members of the Council welcome your intention to keep the Council informed of further developments, especially the actions the FMLN has promised to complete by 4 August 1993.

(Signed) Sir David HANNAY
President of the Security Council



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26072
13 July 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a letter dated 11 July 1993 from Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, which concerns the conduct of the inspection team UNSCOM 60 and a plan for launching a further attack against Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 11 July 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

The inspection team UNSCOM 60 arrived in Baghdad during the afternoon of Saturday, 10 July 1993, with the assigned task, as described by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, Mr. Rolf Ekéus, to the New York media before the team's departure for Iraq, of sealing two sites for testing non-prohibited missiles, namely the sites of Al-Yawm al-Azim and Al-Rafah, although the equipment earlier present on those sites had been dismantled and moved elsewhere.

On Saturday evening, the head of the inspection team, Mr. Mark Silver, spoke to the head of the Iraqi side, General Amer Muhammad Rashid, about the mission entrusted to the team and General Amer stated the Iraqi position, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Al-Yawm al-Azim is a site for testing solid-fuel missiles with a range of under 150 kilometres, which are authorized under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Moreover, the site was established in 1992 with the Special Commission's approval and inspection teams have made repeated visits to it. Al-Rafah is a site used to test short-range, liquid-fuel missile reactors. Its maintenance and continued use have therefore been authorized by the Special Commission.
2. The Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency are authorized to place seals only on equipment which had been used for activities subsequently prohibited under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). The use of the equipment thus sealed will continue to be prohibited until such time as agreement is reached on the future monitoring measures which are currently the subject of technical and political discussions. But the request to seal the equipment on test sites for authorized missiles falls outside this framework and is totally unjustified. It creates a dangerous precedent which could be invoked by some to extend these prohibitions in order to paralyse Iraqi industry for political purposes alien to Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
3. Since Iraq fears the launching of a further United States attack against its territory, the equipment installed on the two sites mentioned above has been dismantled and moved elsewhere, as a preventive measure. Missile inspection team UNSCOM 57 and nuclear inspection team UNSCOM 20 were present when the equipment from other plants and sites was evacuated, also as a preventive measure.
4. Inspection team UNSCOM 60 can inspect the dismantled equipment at the places it has been moved to and can verify that it has not been used. We have no objection to transporting the equipment to other places where the inspection team can inspect it more readily and satisfy itself that it has not been put to use at any time during the crisis.
5. Iraq reserves the right to restore the dismantled equipment to the sites of origin once the crisis is over and to use the equipment on the terms specified

/...

in paragraph 1 above. The inspection teams could then come to the sites in question to satisfy themselves that the above-mentioned terms are being complied with, as they did earlier, without there being any need to seal the equipment or install cameras. We wish to reserve this right because we are anxious to avoid any subsequent disputes with the Special Commission, which itself recognizes that we have never used or intended to use the equipment from the two above-mentioned sites for prohibited purposes.

After hearing the clear and detailed explanations from the Iraqi side, which stated that Iraq was ready to transfer the equipment to other sites to be agreed upon in advance, the head of the inspection team asked to be given time to refer the matter to the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, whose reply he would then transmit to us.

The same day in the evening, the head of the inspection team, before informing us of the reply of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to our proposals, asked for an inspection of the two sites in question on the morning of Sunday, 11 July 1993.

The Iraqi side made all the necessary arrangements to enable the team to visit the two sites in accordance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991). During the visit to Al-Rafah site, the head of the inspection team began to cordon off the site and to attempt to seal it. He behaved in a provocative manner, holding out a tape-recorder microphone to those in charge of the Iraqi team, who were accompanying him, and asking them whether they forbade him to seal the site. The members of the Iraqi team replied calmly that Iraq was awaiting the Special Commission's reply to its proposal and that, if the latter was accepted, the Special Commission's objectives could be realized without any need for seals.

Following this exchange, the head of the inspection team spoke by telephone with his supervisor in New York and said that he had been instructed to leave Iraq.

It seems evident that the inspection team UNSCOM 60 deliberately attempted by subterfuge to create a climate conducive to the launching of a further attack against Iraq, on the pretext that Iraq was not complying with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and was obstructing the work of the inspection team.

Iraq's attitude is based on Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Moreover, the proposals which the Iraqi authorities have submitted to the head of the inspection team demonstrate beyond the shadow of a doubt that Iraq does not desire or intend to contravene the resolutions of the Security Council and that, on the contrary, it is endeavouring by means of specific proposals to meet the Special Commission's requirements, in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Iraq has complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and has collaborated in good faith with the Security Council, the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that those provisions are applied. It has also emphasized its sincere desire to

settle all outstanding matters objectively and constructively on the basis of the rules of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

In my letter of 30 May 1993 to the President of the Security Council, I urged that there should be an objective assessment, made in a professional, technical and legal manner, of the extent of Iraq's implementation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), with a view to the discharge by the Security Council of its obligations towards Iraq under paragraphs 21 and 22 of the resolution.

In a letter dated 20 June 1993 addressed to the President of the Security Council, I said that the Special Commission, which had in actual fact completed supervising the implementation of all the fundamental parts of section C of resolution 687 (1991), wished to begin implementing the provisions of resolution 715 (1991) without having committed itself to informing the Security Council that Iraq's compliance with the provisions of section C of resolution 687 (1991) made it incumbent upon the Council to begin considering in earnest the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), i.e., lifting the economic sanctions imposed upon Iraq.

This is the main issue. Efforts to fabricate a climate of crisis on the pretext of sealing the sites of Al-Yawm al-Azim and Al-Rafah are simply the extension of a series of attempts aimed at muddying the waters and distorting Iraq's position so as to prevent the Security Council from considering the objective and constructive proposals which Iraq has submitted and from beginning to undertake, pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), steps towards the lifting of the three-year-old economic embargo.

Iraq invites the Security Council to shoulder the responsibilities that fall to it under the Charter of the United Nations and to prevent the launching of a further military attack against Iraqi territory.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Iraq
